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Abstract
This paper discusses the issue of hardware and software fault tolerance in
distributed computing environments as well as issues related to efficiency and
flexibility. A set of new fault-tolerant architectures is presented, and a detailed
dependability analysis of these architectures together with an efficiency
evaluation is performed. The proposed architectural solutions are based on the
assumption that the distributed supporting environments under consideration are
highly varying and they would support multiple competing applications
associated with different fault-tolerant architectures, thereby exhibiting dynamic
service characteristics. Stress is placed on adaptation — the major goal of
designs of these new architectures is to attempt the adaptive execution of
redundant components so as to minimize hardware resource consumption and
shorten the response time, as much as possible, for a required level of fault
tolerance.
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I. Introduction
General purpose information-processing distributed systems are coming to life in which
the motivation for distribution is primarily functional or administrative [1]. Such a system may
contain a number of computing nodes with very different characteristics which may be
connected by different kinds of communication networks. The system is intended to support
many different applications and to execute concurrently many unrelated requests that could
compete for both the hardware and the software resources. We will limit our attention to this
class of distributed systems in this paper. However, in such systems distribution is not a direct
solution to dependability and very high dependability cannot be achieved merely by backup or
replication. In fact, the development of highly dependable computing systems may require the
combined utilization of a wide range of techniques, including fault tolerance techniques
intended to cope with the effects of faults and avert the occurrence of failures or at least to warn
a user that errors have been introduced into the state of the system [2]. As we know, the
provision of means for tolerating anticipated hardware faults has been a common practice for
many years. A relatively new development concerns the techniques for tolerating unanticipated
faults such as design faults in general and software faults in particular.
 Software fault tolerance generally needs redundancy of software design or design
diversity. Design diversity can be defined as the production of two or more systems (e.g.
software modules) aimed at delivering the same service through independent designs and
realizations [3]. The systems, produced through the design diversity approach from a common
service specification, are called variants. Incorporating two or more variants of a system,
tolerance to design faults necessitates an adjudicator [4], which is based on some previously
defined decision strategy and is aimed at providing (what was assumed to be) an error-free
result selected from the outcomes of the variants. The well-documented techniques for
tolerating software design faults include recovery blocks [5], N-version programming [6], N
self-checking programming [7].
In recovery blocks (RB) the variants are named alternates and the main part of the
adjudicator is an acceptance test that is applied sequentially to the results of the variants: if the
first variant (primary alternate) fails to pass the acceptance test, the state of the system is
restored and the second variant is invoked on the same input data, and so on sequentially until
either the result from a variant passes the acceptance test or all the variants are exhausted. In the
N-version programming approach (NVP), each of N variants (or versions) is executed in
parallel and the adjudicator performs an adjudication algorithm on the set of results provided by
the variants to identify a correct result. N self-checking programming (NSCP) attains fault
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tolerance by the parallel execution of N self-checking software components. One of the
components is regarded as the active component, and the others are considered as "hot" stand-
by spares. Upon failure of the active component, service delivery is switched to a "hot" spare.
A newer scheme for software fault tolerance, called the Self-Configuring Optimal
Programming scheme (SCOP), has been recently introduced by the authors [8, 9]. SCOP
attempts to reduce the cost of fault-tolerant software, both in space and time, by providing
designers with a flexible redundant architecture where dependability and efficiency could be
combined dynamically at run time. Basically, it is organized in phases, each one involving the
execution of an appropriate subset of variants. At the end of each phase, an adjudication is
performed on a growing syndrome space which contains all the relevant information collected
so far. Once conditions for the release of a result are satisfied any further phases and operations
are ended, or otherwise a new phase is performed until variants are exhausted.
The SCOP scheme has high run-time efficiency, i.e. it makes a good use of the system
resources available, mainly because of its working architecture that is designed following the
observation — different amounts of redundancy are required for error detection and for fault
tolerance. For given fault hypotheses, the amount of resources necessary for the detection of
admitted fault situations is considerably smaller than those necessary for the tolerance to them.
However, the gain of efficiency by SCOP would be limited if the supporting system (involving
the hardware and the system software) were to be used only for a specific application where the
hardware resources saved would be merely left idle. While considering general-purpose
distributed systems, the significance of dynamic control and adaptive redundancy increases
dramatically since dynamic combination of dependability and efficiency highly matches the
characteristics of such systems — the saved resources by a specific application would be
exploited in turn by other competing applications.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section II addresses the problem of how
fault tolerance could be incorporated into computing systems in a controlled manner. In the
third section several hybrid-fault-tolerant architectures are defined at the top of a general-
purpose distributed computing environment. In the fourth section we evaluate dependability of
the architectures under consideration. Section V analyzes these architectures with respect to
resource cost and response speed. We conclude this paper in Section VI.
II. System Design and Hybrid Fault Tolerance
Two major approaches to the incorporation of fault tolerance into systems could be
identified which represent two extremes of a set of possible choices. The first, here called
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structured approach, starts from the system structuring principle widely applied in the design of
general computing systems where a system is partitioned into different (and modular)
abstraction layers, each performing its own tasks and providing services for the upper ones.
Following this approach, the most profitable fault-tolerant techniques may be applied to
different layers in such a way that the service by a specific layer is associated with the required
features, usually with a restricted "failure semantics" [10]. (For example, a fail-stop component
may deliver only correct services or no service at all [11, 12].) This has the merit in controlling
extra complexities of fault tolerance. Since the set of faults needed to be treated is isolated to
within a single layer plus a set of well-defined failures of the underlying layers, the provision
of fault tolerance in that layer becomes a simple and controlled task. However, the approach
may cause the loss of efficiency and performance — firstly, run-time costs introduced by fault
tolerance in each layer are generally summed up resulting in a very high run-time overhead in a
functioning system, especially in absence of faults, and secondly, the fault-tolerant techniques
in different layers may overlap heavily leading to poor performance.
The other approach is here called integrated approach. Redundancy is still spread over
layers (it could not be otherwise) but its management and the actions directed towards tolerance
to faults are concentrated only in some (higher) layer. Faults in some lower layer are
propagated upwards and are masked, further detected and treated, by a previously selected
higher layer. This approach is obviously complementary to the structured one. The overlap of
fault-tolerant mechanisms and techniques could be controlled and minimized so as to improve
efficiency and performance, but the way of incorporating fault tolerance into systems would be
quite complex. In particular, the set and granularity of faults would become much bigger,
which gives rise to difficulties in performing exact fault diagnosis and other derivable
consequences.
It is hard and contended to say whether one approach has to be generally preferred to
the other, and we are not interested in disputing on this issue. In this paper we will describe
our architectures primarily based on the integrated approach. Two layers, one software and one
system/hardware, are distinguished. Fault-tolerant mechanisms and schemes applied in the
software layer are in charge of assuring fault tolerance for a given architecture and for the
corresponding application. To be more exact, the software layer may consist of many different,
fault-tolerant or non-fault-tolerant, applications which use different architectures to achieve
fault tolerance or other goals, whereas the system/hardware layer corresponds to a distributed
supporting environment which contains a set of computing nodes connected by communication
networks. Here, a "hardware" node (or component) is composed of both the hardware and the
associated executive software that provides the necessary services for the execution of the
application software and the node may have disks organized as stable storage.
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Typical hardware failures caused by hardware faults include node (or workstation)
crashes and inability of communication such as the repeated loss of messages. It is usual to
assume that information and data recorded on stable storage are not destroyed by node crashes.
We will assume that although the effects of hardware failures would be masked by fault-
tolerant architectures in the software layer, it has to be the responsibility of the distributed
supporting system to treat hardware failures, including fault diagnosis and the provision of
continued service. Software and hardware faults could be further classified here as independent
and related faults [13]. Related faults are either faults in the common specification, or come
from dependencies in the separate designs and implementations. Independent faults usually
lead to separate failures, whereas related faults manifest themselves in the form of common
mode failures [14]. It is reasonable to assume that faults in the system/hardware layer can be
independent only (rather than related) because of the factors of both professional system
programmers and well-established hardware techniques. In general, such independent faults
will not lead to common mode failures of software components or variants. Under this
assumption common mode failures of a set of software variants in the software layer can be
caused only by related faults among the software variants.
There is some similar work on the definition and analysis of hardware- and software-
fault-tolerant architectures. In particular, Laprie, Arlat, Beounes and Kanoun [14] presented a
set of hybrid-fault-tolerant architectures and analyzed and evaluated three of them. However,
their architectures are based on a fixed set of hardware components and not related to both the
dynamicity of hardware resources available and the efficiency issues. Such architectural
solutions cannot well match the characteristics of general-purpose distributed systems where
the resources must be competed by many unrelated but concurrent service requests. In fact, the
architectures with the fixed requirement to hardware components are either inefficient or
unavailable in a varying environment. Our architectural solutions provided in the next section
are particularly aimed at the problem of how to make a good use of limited hardware (and
common service software) resources in an adaptive manner to achieve a given degree of
dependability.
III. Architectural Solutions
We shall define in this section a set of architectures for hybrid fault tolerance under the
assumption of distributed supporting environments. Figure 1 shows a relationship between our
architectures, abstraction layers and the distributed system.
First, each of our architectural solutions is single-application-oriented. For a given
application, an architecture would contain a set of software variants designed independently, an
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adjudicator and a control program. These programs and the related data (e.g., inputs and
outputs) may be stored on the disks of some nodes. The architecture, or more precisely its
control program, must guarantee that the state information and output results are produced
dependably with a required probability and recorded correctly on stable storage. The control
program is thus responsible for helping error recovery in the software layer as well as for
reporting faults to the supporting system.
Secondly, our architectures are not attached to a fixed set of hardware nodes. An
architecture, thus a given application, must request hardware computing resources from the
supporting system upon invocation and return them to the system when the required
computation terminates. During the computation, the architecture may make requests for
additional resources if necessary.
System/Hardware Layer
Software Layer
Nodes & Network
Application Programs
Fault-tolerant architecture
for a specific application
SYSTEM
Figure 1. Architectures, abstraction layers and system.
Before introducing the architectures, we need further to list a set of assumptions that are
common to all the architectures, which are used to simplify the definitions and evaluation of the
proposed architectural solutions. (1) An adjudicator is replicated on all the hardware
components supporting a specific architecture, but a selected hardware node has responsibility
for taking a final decision from the decisions made by local replicated adjudicators and
producing outputs of the architecture. As the final adjudication is short and simple, it is thus
assumed to be highly dependable. (2) Control programs are organized in a similar manner.
They are distributed locally and a final decision is made by a selected node based on local
control commands.
We characterize an architecture with respect to three aspects: (1) levels of hybrid fault
tolerance, (2) hardware resource consumption, and (3) impacts upon response speed. An
architecture is denoted by a group of multi-elements X (F, N, Hb, Hmax, ...) where
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X indicates a specific architecture for hybrid fault tolerance, being equivalent to the
name of the selected scheme for software fault tolerance;
F indicates the number of (hardware- and software-) faults to be tolerated and is further
expressed by a detailed form: (f, i, j) in which f is the minimum number of hybrid faults to be
tolerated, i is the number of hardware faults to be tolerated assuming perfect software, and j is
the number of software faults to be tolerated assuming perfect hardware;
N is the number of application-specific software variants;
Hb is the basic (minimum) number of hardware nodes an architecture requests from its
supporting system in order to achieve the given level of hybrid fault tolerance F;
 Hmax is the maximum (total) number of hardware nodes an architecture requests from
its supporting system in order to achieve a given level of hybrid fault tolerance F when the
worst fault situation occurs.
The response time of a static architecture attached to a fixed number of hardware nodes
is mainly affected by factors of the supporting system such as scheduling algorithms for
resource allocation and mechanisms for remote access. When an architectural solution is based
on adaptive requests of the hardware components, the response time would be heavily
increased in some rare, worst fault situations. However, if such rare events are acceptable by
certain applications, the average response time of an adaptive architecture is even better than
that of a corresponding static architecture because the number of hardware nodes requested by
it is much smaller in the absence of faults. Due to the system-specific characteristics of
response speeds, we will not incorporate obviously labels for response time into the X (F, N,
Hb, Hmax, ...) expression though we may do so whenever the need arises.
3.1. The SCOP architecture
Although various solutions of the SCOP architecture could be constructed, we here
define two significant instances of SCOP, SCOP((2, 3, 2), 5, 3, 5) and SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3,
2, 4), as depicted in Figures 2 and 3. The SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) instance will be further
analyzed in detail and also used as a sample for dependability evaluation and efficiency
estimation, compared with the corresponding NVP and RB examples.
SCOP((2, 3, 2), 5, 3, 5)
This SCOP instance normally requests three hardware nodes, and two further hardware
nodes may be needed when a failure is detected in the software layer, as shown in Figure 2.
Five application-specific software variants are distributed on, or accessible to, these basic and
additional hardware components. This instance can tolerate any two hybrid (software or
hardware) faults at least. If no any software fault manifests itself during computation, up to
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three hardware faults will be tolerated. In the absence of failures, only three of five variants
execute in parallel on three hardware nodes, thereby benefiting efficiency. Response speed
would also be affected positively since the average time of variant execution, of hardware
resource requests and of possible remote access are relatively short in comparison with the
architecture attached statically to five hardware components. The response time would be
heavily increased only when a failure occurs, and it would be doubled in order to mask the
effect of the faults.
Since realistic examples of implementing software fault tolerance are most based on
three software variants, the next instance has a more practical implication.
SCOP((2,3,2), 5, 3, 5)
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Figure 2. An instance of the SCOP architecture.
SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4)
This instance requests two basic hardware nodes and, when a failure occurs in the
software layer, two further hardware nodes, as shown in Figure 3. Three software variants are
distributed on, or accessible to, these basic and additional hardware components. This instance
can tolerate one (hardware or software) fault at least. If no any software fault manifests itself
during computation, two hardware faults will be tolerated. Normally, two variants execute in
SCOP((1,2,1), 3, 2, 4)
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Figure 3. Another instance of the SCOP architecture.
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 parallel on two hardware nodes. Just in the presence of faults, the third variant will execute in
parallel with one of the other variants on two additional nodes requested.
More precisely, SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) organizes the execution of variants into two
phases. In the first phase, variant 1 and variant 2 run on two hardware components and the
adjudicator compares their results. Consistent results are immediately accepted. Otherwise, the
second phase begins: variant 3 and variant 1 run on two additional hardware components. Then
the adjudicator makes a decision based on all the four results, seeking a 2-out-of-4 majority.
Figure 4 shows the details of how this instance works with respect to different fault situations,
where the paths correspond to the different possible outcomes:
(1) at the end of the first phase there exists a majority representing a correct computation
and the output is a correct result;
(2) at the end of the first phase the result is rejected, at the end of the second phase there
exists a majority representing a correct computation and the output is a correct result;
(3) at the end of the first phase an erroneous result is accepted;
(4) at the end of the first phase the result is rejected, at the end of the second phase an
erroneous result is accepted;
(5) at the end of the second phase the result is rejected;
(6) the duration of the redundant execution exceeds a specified limit (when a real-time
constraint is present) and the execution is aborted.
W1 W3
W2 W4
Variant 2
Variant 1
Adjudicator
1
3
2 6
4
5
Adjudicator
Variant 1
Variant 3
Figure 4. SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) operation.
3.2. NVP and RB architectures
Two instances being considered here are NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) and RB((1, 2, 1), 2,
2, 3) for the sake of comparison and the subsequent evaluation.
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NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4)
This instance requests four hardware nodes. Three software variants are executed in
parallel on these nodes, as shown in Figure 5. The NVP instance can tolerate one hybrid fault.
If no any software fault manifests itself during computation, two hardware faults can be
tolerated. The response time of NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) is guaranteed by executing the variants
within a single phase, but it may be affected negatively by the time of requesting four hardware
components from the system and that of possible remote access. In the extreme case where its
request of hardware components cannot be met completely, this instance will not work.
NVP((1,2,1), 3, 4, 4) and RB((1,2,1), 2, 2, 3)
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Figure 5. Instances of NVP and RB architectures.
RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3)
Normally, the primary variant V1 is executed on two hardware components (see Figure
5). The results produced by the replicated variants are compared. (1) If they agree, acceptance
tests are applied to them. The agreed result is released unless both acceptance tests reject it. In
this case, an additional hardware node will be requested and the variant V2 will be executed on
it. (2) If the results produced by the replicated variants in the first phase disagree, a diagnostic
routine is applied to them. When both hardware nodes are diagnosed as faulty, an additional
node is needed to execute the variant V2. This proposed solution can tolerate at least one
hardware or software fault. It is also highly efficient when no fault manifests itself during
computation — a most possible situation. Response speed would also be affected positively.
However, the application that uses this architectural solution must be able to accept a rare, but
still possible heavy degradation — the response time would be much longer while performing
self-diagnosis and executing the variant V2 in order to mask the effect of two hardware faults.
page 11
IV. Dependability Evaluation
In this section, the dependability analysis of SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4), NVP((1, 2, 1),
3, 4, 4) and RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3) defined in section III is performed adopting a Markov
approach. In [14], the dependability analysis of hybrid architectures tolerating only one
hardware or one software consecutive fault is conducted by first determining the two models
for the hardware and for the software separately and then combining the obtained results into a
single model. Our framework differs from [14] in (1) the faults our architectures tolerate and
(2) the used model which is a combined one for both hardware and software faults. Our
analysis starts from a set of special software failures which would lead to the failure of the
whole architecture despite of the hardware conditions. Hardware failures are considered only
when they affect the whole architecture alone or with some software failures together. In the
analysis, we do not distinguish between detected and undetected failures. In addition, with the
term adjudicator (and AT when referred to the RB architecture) we mean both the adjudication
function and the control program.
Basic assumptions special for the evaluation are:
(1) hardware failures are independent and the probability that correct software variants
running on the failed hardware nodes produce the same incorrect outputs is negligible;
(2) compensation among failures never happens, neither between software variants, nor
between software variants and the adjudicator nor between hardware components and
variants;
(3) for architectures with multiple phases, the adjudicator exercised in more than one phase
will show the same erroneous or correct behaviour in all the phases (from the software
behaviour point of view);
(4) hardware faults are independent from software faults (and vice versa): a failure in an
hardware component will cause an incorrect output of the variant running on it, but will
have no influence in activating a fault in the variant itself.
Table 1 shows the relevant types of failures of software and hardware components for
the SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) architecture.
The detailed dependability model of one execution of the SCOP architecture is
illustrated in Figure 6. We briefly explain the meanings of the states and arcs in the figure. The
model doesn't exactly describe the two phase execution of the architecture because the states
representing the execution of the second phase are introduced only when necessary.
page 12
Failure Types Probabilities
3 variants fail with consistent results q3v
2 variants fail with consistent results (the 3rd variant, can fail or not but produces a result
different from the previous two)
q2v
The adjudicator fails selecting an erroneous result (given that an erroneous result has been
produced by a variant)
qvd
A variant fails, conditioned on none of the above events happening qiv
Conditioned on the existence of a majority, the adjudicator fails by not recognising a
majority (without releasing any result)
qd
An hardware component fails during an execution, affecting the variant and/or the
adjudicator running on it (independence is assumed between the failure of two or more
hardware components and between hardware components and variants)
qh
Table 1: Failure types and notation for SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4).
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Figure 6. The dependability model for SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4).
I initial state of an execution;
F failure of the architecture (absorbing state);
S success of the architecture (absorbing state);
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VP two variants are executed on two hardware components in the first phase; the arc from
VP to F is labelled with the sum of the probabilities of the software failures causing the
failure of the whole architecture without considering the hardware behaviour (i.e.,
common mode failures among the variants and among the variants and the adjudicator,
and the independent failure of both the executed variants);
SP1 one of the two variants executes correctly while the other fails, and the second phase is
performed;
SP2 the two variants execute correctly, but if the adjudicator fails in recognizing the agreeing
result, the second phase will be performed unnecessarily; if the adjudicator works
correctly, the state representing the correctness of the software components executed
during the first phase is reached;
Fv1 just one variant fails after the first phase; success or failure of the whole execution
depends on the behaviour of the hardware components through the two phases;
Ss software components including the adjudicator in the first phase are correct; the specific
behaviour of the hardware components leads to the final state S or to the second phase
(states Fh1 and Fh2);
Fh1 the second phase operates due to the failure of one hardware component during the first
phase; success or failure of the whole execution depends on the behaviour of both
hardware components and the software variants in the second phase;
Fh2 the second phase operates due to the failure of two hardware components; success or
failure of the whole execution depends on the behaviour of both hardware components
and the software variants in the second phase.
To simplify the expression of the solution, we define a set of intermediate parameters,
as shown in the right side of Figure 5. From the state transition diagram, the probability of
failure QSCOP((1,2,1),3,2,4) of the SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2, 4) architecture is:
QSCOP((1,2,1), 3,2,4) = q1+(1-q1)qiv2+pI(qd+(1-qd)(qh2(1-pII(1-qiv))+q3q4))+
+ (1-q1)q2(qiv+(1-qiv)qd+(1-qiv)(1-qd)(1-pIV))
Similar models are derived for the other two architectures. Owing to the limitation of
space, we omit details of these models and show the solutions directly. Note that Table 1 can
be applied to NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4). Table 2 introduces the relevant types of failures of
software and hardware components for the RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3) architecture.
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Failure Types Probabilities
Primary and secondary alternates fail with consistent results and AT accepts their results qpsa
The above event does not occurs, primary alternate fails and AT accepts its result qpa
The secondary alternate fails and AT accepts its result, conditional on the secondary being
executed
qsa
Primary and secondary alternates fail (with consistent results) and AT rejects their results qps
Failure of the primary or secondary alternate (assumed independent) qp, qs
Failure of the acceptance test causing it to reject a result, given the result is correct qa
An hardware component fails during an execution, affecting the variant and/or the
adjudicator running on it (independence is assumed between the failure of two or more
hardware components and between hardware components and variants)
qh
probability that an hardware failure affects only the AT running on it, conditional on the
hardware failed
cAT
Table 2: Failure types and notation for RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3).
The expressions of the probability of failure, QNVP((1,2,1),3,4,4) and QRB((1,2,1),2,2,3),
are as follows:
QNVP((1,2,1),3,4,4) = q1+(1-q1)q2+3qiv(1-q1)(1-qiv)2(qd+(1-qd)(1-pIV))+
+(1-q1)(1-qiv)3(qd+(1-qd)qI)
QRB((1,2,1),2,2,3) = q1+(1-q1)q5+(1-q1)qp(1-qa)(1-qs)(1-PIII)+
+(1-q1)(1-qp)(1-qa)(qh2(1-cAT)2+2qh2cAT(1-cAT))(qs+(1-qs)qh+qh2cAT2qs)
Table 3 lists a set of intermediate parameters used in the above expressions.
NVP intermediate
parameters
RB intermediate
parameters
q1=3q2v+q3v+3qvd q1=qpa+qpsa+qps+qpqsa
q2=3qiv2(1-qiv)+qiv3 q5=qpqa(1-qs)+qpqs+(1-qp)qa
qI=qh4+4qh3(1-qh) pII=(1-qh)2
pIV=(1-qh)4 pIII=(1-qh)3
Table 3: Intermediate parameters for the NVP and RB architectures.
The derived expressions are too complex to allow a direct comparison among the three
architectures with respect to dependability. As an example, Figure 7 gives a plot of the
functions representing probabilities of failure of the three architectures under consideration. To
produce the plot, precise values are chosen for the dependability parameters and listed in Table
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4. (1) The values of parameters representing adjudicator failures and common-mode failure
among three software variants are fixed for SCOP and NVP; in particular, it is assumed that
AT has a higher probability of failure since it is usually more complex than the other
adjudicators. (2) The probability of common-mode failure between two variants is assumed to
be three orders of magnitude higher than that of independent failures; this assumption is also
applied to the probability of common-mode failure between one alternate and the AT in RB. (3)
The probability of independent failure of variants varies between 10-5 and 10-3. (4) The
probability of hardware failure is fixed.
Recovery Block N-Version Programming SCOP
qps = qpa = qsa= Q 10-3
qpsa = 10-10
qp = qs =Q
qa = 2 × 10-7
Q: variable from 10-5 to 10-3
qh = 10-3
cAT = 10-3
q2v = Q 10-3
q3v = qvd =10-10
qd = 10-9
qiv = Q
Q: variable from 10-5 to 10-3
qh = 10-3
q2v = Q 10-3
q3v = qvd = 10-10
qd = 10-9
qiv = Q
Q: variable from 10-5 to 10-3
qh = 10-3
Table 4: Values of the "dependability" parameters used in the example.
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Figure 7. Plot of the probabilities of failure for the three architectures.
It must be mentioned that the values chosen for parameters simply represent a line in the
space of all the possible combinations. Hence, it does not allow to derive any definitive
conclusion about dependability of the three architectures in general. However, the example
seems to be consistent with some intuitive conclusions. Curves related to the architectures
based on SCOP and RB appear very close in the figure although we would remind the reader
that the RB architecture needs perfect diagnostic routines. NVP seems to be slightly worse.
This is because the architecture employs two more hardware components than SCOP and RB
in most cases.
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V. Resource Cost and Response Time
In this section we estimate the average resource consumption (i.e., the average number
of hardware components required) and response time for each execution of a given
architecture. For each execution of an architecture, when it is invoked, a timing constraint τ is
set. The necessary computing nodes are first required to the system, then the proper software
must be loaded on them before execution takes place. In particular, RB and SCOP architectures
(which are organised in phases) request the processors in a strictly necessary manner — further
hardware components will be requested only when the need arises. In the case of the NVP
architecture, all the processors must be obtained at the start since the execution is purely
parallel. We assume that the time necessary for obtaining the processors and loading the
software is an independent and exponentially distributed random variable Wi with parameter
λw and the execution times are independent and exponentially distributed random variables Ei
with parameter λi, for the different combinations of variant/processor, and Ed with parameter
λd, for the adjudicator.
5.1. Average resource consumption
NVP((1, 2, 1), 3, 4, 4) is not organised in phases — it executes its variants in parallel.
Therefore it has a constant resource consumption which is equal to four, i.e.,
AV . RESNVP = 4
The SCOP architecture may require two phases. The execution completes at the end of
the first phase (paths 1 and 3 in Figure 4) with probability p1SCOP, while it includes phase 2
(paths 2, 4 and 5) with probability 1-p1SCOP. From the dependability evaluation of the
architecture and using the same set of intermediate parameters we have
p1SCOP = pI (1 − qd )pII + (q2v + q3v )(1 − qd )pII + 2qvd .
The average number of resources required in one execution of SCOP((1, 2, 1), 3, 2,
4) thus becomes
AV . RESSCOP = 2 + 2(1 − p1SCOP ).
The same argument applies to the RB architecture; its execution may consist of up to
two phases. From the scheme of operation and the dependability analysis we obtain the
probability p1RB of stopping at the end of the first phase (it includes also the case where it is
necessary to run diagnostic routines):
p1RB = (1 − qa )((1 − qp − qps − qpa − qpsa )pII + 2qhqp(1 − qh )(1 − cAT )) + qpa + qpsa .
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The average number of resources required in one execution of RB((1, 2, 1), 2, 2, 3)
thus becomes
AV . RESRB = 2 + (1 − p1RB ).
The average number of processors required by adaptive architectures based on SCOP
and RB is a function of the probability that the architectures stop in the ith phase, which
depends, in its turn, on the dependability parameters. So this must be numerically evaluated by
assigning values to those parameters. Although the probability of common-mode failures is the
main factor in success or failure of each individual execution, its influence on the number of
required phases seem to be relatively weak. In Figure 8 we show the plot of the average
number of processors required by the SCOP and RB architectures (continuous and dashed
lines respectively) during each execution, which is regarded as a function of the probability of
independent failures. The values assigned to the parameters are those already used in the
example of dependability evaluation in the previous section.
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Figure 8. Average number of processors required vs. failure probability.
The realism of such kind of evaluation depends on realistic values and ranges which
must be derived for each individual realisation. However, for most plausible values the
probability that SCOP or RB stops at the end of the first phase is very high. This means that
the average number of hardware components requested by these adaptive architectures is
almost constant and very close to the number required to start with.
5.2. Response time
To analyse response time we follow the same approach used in [15, 16]. It is sufficient
to designate Yc the duration of an execution of the redundant component if the watchdog timer
is absent. To compare the architectures, we derive the distribution of Yc and its mean µ. The
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probability pbt that an execution violates the timing constraint (that is, Yc exceeds τ) can
provide further information.
We first focus on the SCOP architecture and show how these quantities can be
computed, then we will just define Yc for the other architectures. We designate Yw1 the time
necessary for obtaining two processors in the first phase, Yw1 = max{W1, W2}, YE1 the time
for executing variants 1 and 2, YE1 = max{E1, E2}, similarly Yw2 = max{W3, W4} and YE2 =
max{E3, E4}. Remembering that p1SCOP represents the probability of completing execution at
the end of the first phase, the execution time Yc without the watchdog timer is:
Yc =  
Yc1 = YW1 + YE1 + Yd = max{W1,W2} + max{E1, E2} + Yd , with probability p1SCOP
Yc2 = YW1 + YE1 + Yd + YW 2 + YE2 + Yd , with probability (1 − p1SCOP )

The probability density function of Yc is a weighted sum of the probability density
functions for the two expressions above. In these expressions, the random variables Yw1, YE1,
Yw2 and YE2 are not exponentially distributed. Their cumulative distribution function can be
easily obtained. For Yw1 it is:
GYW1 (y) =  
(1 -  - wy λe ) (1 -  -y wλe ) , if y ≥ 0
0, otherwise

Thus, we can first compute (through convolutions and summations) the probability
density function of Yc and then the probability pbt that an execution violates the timing
constraint τ  for some values of τ, btp  =  1 -  cY f (y)dy0
τ∫ .
The NVP architecture requires four processors; when all of them are available, the
variants are performed in parallel before the adjudication takes place. Based on the same setting
as that for the SCOP architecture, we designate Yw the time for obtaining the four necessary
processors, Yw1 = max{W1, W2, W3, W4}, YE the time for executing the variants, YE =
max{E1, E2, E3, E4}. The execution time Yc without the watchdog timer is:
Yc = YW + YE + Yd = max{W1,W2 ,W3,W4} + max{E1, E2 , E3, E4} + Yd .
The RB architecture requires also diagnostic routines to check hardware failures;
therefore additional parameters λDi are used to represent the mean of the exponentially
distributed random variables Di, each of which accounts for the time necessary for running the
diagnostic routine on a hardware processor. We designate Yw the time for obtaining the two
processors necessary in the first phase, Yw = max{W1, W2}, YE the time for executing the
primary on them, YE = max{E1, E2}, then Y2 = {W3 + E3 + Yd} the time for acquiring a third
processor and for running a variant and an acceptance test on it, and YD = max{D1, D2} the
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time spent in running diagnostic routines. According to the operation scheme of this
architecture, four different situations may arise:
(1) the scheme stops after running the basic step: the primary and the acceptance test;
(2) after step (1) the diagnostic routine is run (with probability p1);
(3) after step (2) a third processor is required to run a variant and AT (with probability
p3);
(4) after step (1) a third processor is required, and a variant and AT run on it (with
probability p2).
The probabilities of these events may be derived from the dependability analysis, and
the execution time Yc without the watchdog timer becomes:
Yc =  YW + YE + Yd + p1(YD + p3(Y2 )) + p2 (Y2 )
In order to compare the response times offered by the three architectures we proceed to
assign values to the timing parameters. As we did previously, we attempt to assign reasonable
values, as shown in Table 5, to the mean execution time of the variants, of the diagnostic
routine for RB and of the adjudicators while regarding the mean of the time necessary for
obtaining the processors ready to be used (accounting also for loading the software) as variable
and ranging from one tenth to ten times of that of the variant execution. Again the aim is to
show how the evaluation is carried out. We fixed the probability that SCOP or RB stops at
some phase which corresponds to the probability of independent failures of the software
variants 10-4.
Recovery Blocks N-Version Programming SCOP
λp = 1/5
λs = 1/5
λd = 1/5
λD = 1/5
λW = 1/50, 1/5 and 2
λ1 = 1/5
λ2 = 1/5
λ3 = 1/5
λ4  = 1/5
λd = 2
λW = 1/50, 1/5 and 2
λ1 = 1/5
λ2 = 1/5
λ3 = 1/5
λ4  = 1/5
λd = 2
λW = 1/50, 1/5 and 2
Table 5: Values of the "timing" parameters used.
As results deriving from such setting we show in Figure 9 the plots of the pdf Yc, in
the case where the watchdog timer is absent, for three values of λW = 1/50, 1/5 and 2
respectively.
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time for one execution (in milliseconds)
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Figure 9. Distribution of Yc (a): λW  = 1/50, (b): λW  = 1/5 and (c): λW  = 2.
For three different values of λW, Table 6 shows the mean response time and the
probabilities Pbt of exceeding the timing constraints when τ = 30, 50 and 70 milliseconds, with
respect to the three architectures under consideration.
R B NVP SCOP
Mean of Yc 87.5211 115.083 83.1825
 λW = 1/50 Pbt (τ = 30) 0.904756 0.986965 0.87031
Pbt (τ = 50) 0.721392 0.910135 0.678098
Pbt (τ = 70) 0.5355256 0.767781 0.497436
Mean of Yc 20.0165 21.3333 15.5341
λW = 1/5 Pbt (τ = 30) 0.1391803 0.144972 0.0549317
Pbt (τ = 50) 0.0076969 0.00583087 0.00192367
Pbt (τ = 70) 0.000290 0.000165896 0.000056007
Mean of Yc 13.26604 11.9583 8.76924
λW = 2 Pbt (τ = 30) 0.034107 0.0135991 0.0065822
Pbt (τ = 50) 0.001061 0.000250371 0.000123435
Pbt (τ = 70) 0.000027 0.00000458613 0.00000231025
Table 6: Some results of the timing evaluation.
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VI. Conclusions
In this paper, the issue of hybrid fault tolerance in distributed computing environments
has been addressed. A set of new architectures for tolerating both hardware and software faults
have been defined and evaluated under different aspects including dependability, resource
consumption and response time. Architectures based on the RB and SCOP schemes show the
ability to adapt their execution to the manifestation of faults so as to minimize hardware
resource consumption and to shorten the response time as much as possible. In almost all the
cases their performance figures are much better than those of the architectures with static
resource consumption. This obviously makes the first two kinds of architectures preferable to
the other one while considering the competing applications in distributed environments.
However, due to many dynamic factors of the environment under consideration, it is difficult
to derive definitive conclusions about dependability and efficiency of the adaptive and non-
adaptive architectures in the general case. For example, architectures based on the NVP
approach could appear to be faster than those adaptive architectures as they always execute
within one phase, especially in the manifestation of faults. But, depending on the underlying
system, adaptive architectures, in particular the SCOP ones, would be better as to the mean
response time, as shown in the examples of section V.
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